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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Richard C. Clark*
Introduction
In 1950, Congress passed an amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act
that was deemed by many to be long overdue. The relevant portion of section
7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.'
Since the passage of this legislation, debate has swelled over the scope of
its provisions, the criteria of judgment to be used in applying its provisions,
and the wisdom of the measure. Anyone addressing himself to the task of
analyzing the antitrust laws of our country is necessarily awed by the immense
mass of literature already written on the subject.' The gnawing suspicion is everpresent that nothing new can be added, a suspicion that suggests to the timid that
nothing new should be attempted. But, mindful of these hazards, this article will
explore yet further terrain, and attempt to throw some light on a problem that
has at least the redeeming feature of being heretofore largely neglected. An
analysis will be made herein of the relation between the amended Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and that type of corporate integration known as the conglomerate merger.
At the outset, it is well to note the familiar distinction taken between the
three varieties of corporate merger: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. No
definition can ever be asserted with confidence that it takes into account all
dimensions of the thing defined. But, for purposes of this article, certain broad
* A.B., LL.B., Notre Dame; member, Illinois and District of Columbia Bars; Visiting
Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2 See, e.g., the listings of books and articles published since 1959 on various aspects of
the antitrust problem in 17 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33-37, 134, n. 30 (1960).
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operational descriptions will serve as adequate definitions of these three types
of mergers.
A horizontal merger is the acquisition by one firm of another firm competing in the same market with the acquiring firm, at the same level of production or distribution. Examples of horizontal mergers abound. Two corporations, both manufacturing, say, home appliances, and setting their prices on a
competitive basis, would be parties to a horizontal merger. A vertical merger,
on the other hand, involves not the integration of two firms competing at the
same level, but the integration of two firms at different levels of production or
distribution, but who stand in some relation to each other with respect to product
flow. If, for example, a manufacturing firm were to acquire its main retail
outlet, this would be known as a forward vertical merger. Were the same
manufacturer to acquire its main source of raw materials and supplies, this
would be referred to as a backward vertical merger.
The conglomerate merger is, obviously, neither of these types, but represents an integration between two firms which are non-competitive with respect
to the same market, and further, who stand in no direct relation to one another
at different levels of economic organization and product flow. There is no visible
agreement among authorities as to the exact content of the term "conglomerate
merger." Failing any precision, conglomerate merger is oftentimes a catch-all
used to gather under one head all the residual integrations remaining after the
categories of horizontal and vertical have been exhausted. For purposes of
this article, it will be sufficient to define a conglomerate merger as the fusion
of two firms sharing no common competitive market between them and bearing
no vertical relationship to one another of supplier-customer.
Until very recently, it was assumed that Section 7 of the Clayton Act had
reference only to horizontal mergers, and consequently, the main thrust of
governmental attack has been in this direction. However, it is now clear that
section 7 also has applicability to vertical mergers, this step having been taken
by judicial extension' and also by the 1950 amendment to the act. 4 But the
antitrust landscape is virtually barren of any instances where a conglomerate
merger as such has been questioned by the antitrust enforcement agencies of
the government. But there is reason to believe this situation may not long persist. Recent indications hint that the government may be preparing a frontal
attack on conglomerate mergers.' What this means, of course, is that a vast
expanse of trackless ground must be traversed by government agency and private lawyer alike, in an effort to evolve sufficiently reliable criteria by which
to judge and predict the anticompetitive effects of this form of corporate
acquisition. And this in a field already large with criticism of its uncertain
standards. This article will attempt to place in some measure of perspective the
3 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). Though
handed down after the amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act, the case is based on the
provisions of the act as they existed prior to 1950.
4 See H. R. RaP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949), wherein the intent of
Congress to include vertical mergers within the ambit of section 7 is clearly revealed.
5 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 1961, p. 10, col. 1. This editorial states that the ".
word in Washington is that more emphasis will be put on acquisition against business mergers
intended for true diversification purposes- that is, acquiring new or different lines of
products."
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problems that must be confronted in this undertaking, and to suggest certain
broad lines of analysis and judgment that may be used in examining the relevant data.
I. Legislative History of Amended Section 7
After several abortive attempts in the late 1940s, the proponents of
stronger antitrust laws were able, in 1949, to bring to, the floor of the House
of Representatives a bill7 to strengthen the antimerger provisions of the Clayton
Act. Section 7 had been largely emasculated by alert corporate counsel and
sympathetic decisions from the Supreme Court.8 Briefly, section 7 as originally
enacted forbade only those anticompetitive mergers that were achieved by the
purchase of stock of the acquired corporation. The statute did not prevent
mergers consummated through purchase of assets of the acquired firm. This
legislative omission, perhaps deliberate at the time of the passage of the act,'
was quickly seized upon as a convenient loophole through which could be
steered mergers that would tend substantially to lessen competition, and which
would undoubtedly have fallen under the proscription of the act had the purchase of stock method been used. But being carried out through the purchase
of assets rather than stock control, there was no legislative mandate for challenging these mergers.
Consequently, the main brunt of the attack mounted by the proponents
of a section 7 amendment was directed toward plugging the purchase-of-assets
loophole. Evasion of section 7 was a disarmingly easy task for corporations
seeking to consummate mergers that might otherwise be forbidden by the act.
Proponents of the amendment declared that the original provision had become
"nothing but a travesty and laughing stock." 0 One spokesman lamented the
failure, almost from the outset, of section 7 to cope with the problem of economic concentration, pointing out that "The law did not check the monopolistic concentration of economic power; it merely encouraged the use of more
effective devices for increasing that concentration." 1 As long as the statute
was on the books, it was imperative to give it the strength and enforceability
needed to make it the effective piece of antitrust legislation the original framers
in 1914 intended it to be. If this could not be brought about, it was urged, it
would be the better to remove the statute from the books altogether by repealing the Clayton Act, rather than permit it to remain as a hapless piece of useless legislation. 2
The pivot around which the House debate on the amendment to section 7
6 See 95 CoNG. REc. 11497 (1949), for a brief history of prior legislative efforts in this
direction.
7 H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., ist Sess. (1949).
8 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U.S. 587
(1934); Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
9 See H. R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949), pointing out that at the
time of the passage of the original Clayton Act, acquisition by means of stock control was
the most common method of merger. Congress thus apparently deemed it unnecessary to
include prohibitions against acquisitions through purchase of assets. See also 95 CONG. REC.
11502 (1949).
10 95 CONG. REc. 11502 (1949) (remarks of Representative Douglas).
11 95 CoNG. REC. 11494 (1949) (remarks of Representative Carroll).
12 95 CoNG. REc. 11489 (1949) (remarks of Representative. Keating).
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revolved was a set of statistics furnished by the Federal Trade Commission on
the increase in mergers between 1940 and 1947.' The data revealed that during this interval, approximately 2,500 formerly independent firms had disappeared because of mergers, and that the total assets of the acquired firms
amounted to $5.2 billion, or 5/2 per cent of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations. 4 The conclusion drawn from this data was that if the
rate of mergers continued unchecked, the suffocation of small business would
be inevitable. As economic concentration mounted, the small enterprise would
find it increasingly difficult to remain in business on a competitive basis. Lacking the economic resources to compete for its share of the market, the small
enterprise would knuckle under, sell out, and be drawn into the ever-widening
vortex of economic control exercised by the large firms. The projected situation
thus presented the classical situation for vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
statutes, particularly Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Section 7 was theoretically tailor-made for the type of situation posed by
the FTC report, and for curbing the results predicted by the proponents of the
legislation: a growing movement toward economic concentration, loss by small
business of its competitive position, and ultimate monopoly by the corporate
giants.' 5 That the Clayton Act was tailor-made for entry onto this battleground
was clear from it§ original purpose. Congress, realizing in 1914 that the Sherman Act 6 was operational only when economic concentration had achieved
full monopoly status, passed the Clayton Act to head off, in advance, conduct
that would tend to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Its purpose
was to "nip monopoly in the bud,"' 7 to head off inchoate economic movement
that would eventually result in monopoly were it allowed to run full course.
In fact, however, the Clayton Act was far from tailor-made for the task.
The merger activity between 1940 and 1947 had been carried out largely
through the purchase-of-assets route, and consequently was outside the sweep
of section 7. There was every reason to believe this facile strategy of evasion
would be resorted to in the future, and the FTC, as well as the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, would be hamstrung in taking effective action.
The legislative history thus reveals that one of the chief preoccupations in
passing the amendment to section 7 was with the wholesale circumvention of
the statute as it was presently written.
Further, in addition to the inability of the Clayton Act to cope effectively
with mergers exhibiting substantial anticompetitive consequences, the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co. showed that the Sherman Act was likewise incapable of blocking mergers that fell short of thorough13 FTC, REPORT ON
14 Id. at 17.

THE MERGER MOVEMENT:

A SummARY

REPORT

(1948).

15 What the architects of the Bill probably feared more than a thorough-going monopoly
situation in American industry was an oligopolistic structure in which three or four large
corporations would control an entire industry. 95 CONG. REc. 11493 (1949) (remarks of
Representative Yates).
16 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
17 Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 901 (1953).
18 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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going monopoly but which would nonetheless produce substantial competitive
deterioration.
However, it is equally clear that the amendment was designed to improve
upon the original in several other important particulars. Under the original
act, the only relevant inquiry was whether competition was substantially lessened
between the acquiring and the acquired firm. The amendment eliminated this
test, substituting the criterion of whether the acquisition will lessen competition
"in any line of commerce." This change had a two-fold purpose. First, it makes
it clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit all mergers -particularly
those between small firms that might be required to merge for survival-but
only those mergers having a substantial competitive effect within a particular
line of commerce." Second, and more positively, the language was used to
strengthen the proscriptions of section 7 by interdicting any merger that would
tend to produce substantial competitive deterioration within any relevant market.2" Further, this change was complemented by the substitution of "any
section of the country" for the former phrase "any community." That is, the
geographical locus of where competition was being diminished was widened,
so that the statute would not operate to prevent the merging of two small local
businesses situated in the same community."'
But the change of greatest significance, for purposes of this article, was that
section 7 was now to be used as a weapon against any type of merger, horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Until 1950, it was assumed that section 7 had
no application to acquisitions other than horizontal integrations. The fragile
balloon surrounding this assumption, right or wrong, was punctured by the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. du Pont & Co.,22 squarely holding
the provision applicable to vertical as well as horizontal mergers.
In the House of Representatives, one of the spokesmen in behalf of the
bill arose to address himself to certain typical questions that might be asked
with respect to the measure. Citing examples of horizontal and vertical mergers,
the speaker went on to say:
A third avenue of expansion - and this is one of the most
detrimental movements to a free enterprise economy -is the conglomerate acquisition. This is the type which carries the activities
of giant corporations into all sorts of fields, often completely unrelated to their normal operations. In times such as these, when big
corporations have such huge quantities of funds, they are constantly
looking around for new kinds of businesses to enter. By this process
they build up huge business enterprises which enable them to play
one type of business against another in order to drive out competition.23
This is the sole place in the House debates reflecting any extended reference
to conglomerate mergers. Mention is made of conglomerate acquisition in a
19 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1950).
20 See generally MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 305-10 (1959).
21 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1950).
22 353 U.S. 586 (1957). The case was decided under the original language of section 7,
inasmuch as the Government had challenged a series of stock acquisitions that took place
between 1917-19.
23 95 CONG. Rac. 11496 (1949) (remarks of Representative Boggs).
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few other places in the record, so there can be no speculation allowed that
the proponents of the bill were not aware of this type of merger. Speculation
that is proper, however, is why the point was not made with greater specificity
if the legislators firmly intended to include this type of merger within the
ambit of the statute.
Senate floor debate sheds little additional light on the problem. After the
House had passed the measure in August, 1949, the bill came to the Senate
in 1950. Here also it would seem that the chief pre-occupation of the proponents was with sealing up the widening crack in the statute that permitted
mergers to be consummated through purchase of assets. Principal spokesmen
for the bill, Senators O'Conor, Kefauver, and O'Mahoney, like their counterparts in the House, also relied heavily on merger data drawn from the FTC
report. Conclusions from this data were much the same as those drawn in
the House debates. It was urged that the merger trend, underway since 1940
and in sharp advance since the close of the Second War, was forcing the small
businessman to sell out. Industrial concentration and market domination were
swiftly replacing multiple, diversified ownership and free market competition.
If allowed to proceed unchecked, the argument went, America would soon find
itself with a monopoly-dominated economy. Senator O'Conor warned of grim
political consequences stemming from this growing concentration. One of the
"principal reasons" for the bill was:
To protect and preserve the American system of free enterprise.
If concentration continues to increase the Nation will surely sink
into some form of collectivism- facism, socialism, or communism.
The replacement of free-enterprise economy by any of these forms
of collectivism is unthinkable. Yet, unless the trend toward increasing
concentration is arrested, collectivism may well be upon
24
US.

Senator Kefauver expressed concern for the small investor who had no
control over the economic giant he "owned,"2 and for the shrivelling up of
individual initiative and self-sufficient entrepreneurs.
I think that we are approaching a point where a fundamental
decision must be made in regard to this problem of economic concentration. Shall we permit the economy of the country to gravitate
into the hands of a few corporations, even though they may have
very widespread stockholder distribution, with central-office managers remote from the places where their products are made, and
the destiny of the people determined by the decisions of persons
whom they never see or never know of? Or on the other hand
are we going
to preserve small business, local operations, and free
2
enterprise?

6

It is clear that the overriding concern in the Senate, as well as in the House,
was with the purchase-of-assets loophole in the Clayton Act, and with the foreboding consequences the unchecked merger movement held for the economy
24 96 CONo. Rrc. 16507 (1950).
25 On the general problem of the separation between ownership and control in the
present-day corporation, and the remoteness of the small investor from the policies and
operations of the large corporation, see BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
26 96 CONG. REC. 16450 (1950).
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as a whole. Nowhere is any visible attempt made to demonstrate that conglomerate mergers were to be brought within the ambit of amended section 7.
Indeed, the term was used but twice during the entire Senate debate.2 7 Senator
O'Mahoney, interpreting certain data prepared by the Department of Commerce on corporate mergers, made the following statement:
[I]n the study of the Department of Commerce to which I referred
a little while ago nearly 25 percent of the 18 mergers by acquisition
of assets represented what was known as conglomerate mergers; that
is to say, corporations buying other corporations dealing in unrelated
businesses. For example, the Universal Match Co. purchased a
number of candy corporations. This widespread entry of corporations into unrelated lines of manufacture is, in part, a result of the
extraordinary accumulation of liquid assets in corporate treasuries
because of their operations during the war, and because we have
not"taken the steps necessary to prevent this constant concentration
which closes the door to enterprise by the citizens of 28the States
which are represented by every Senator upon this floor.
While floor debate is unsatisfactory and inconclusive on the question under
consideration, clear and unequivocal language is found in the House Committee Report 2 Here too, however, discussion of giving the Clayton Act the
teeth necessary to block corporate mergers carried out through purchase-ofassets bulks large in the pages of the report. Conglomerate acquisitions are
mentioned once in the report, but the reference is strong and unambiguous,
rendering perfectly clear the desire of Congress to include conglomerate mergers within the operational perimeter of section 7 enforcement.
[I]n the proposed bill, as has been pointed out above, the test of
the effect on competition between the acquiring and the acquired
firm has been eliminated. One reason for this action was to make it
clear that the bill is not intended to prohibit all acquisitions among
competitors. But there is a second reason, which is to make it clear
that the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical
and conglomerate, as well as horizontal, which have the specified
effects of substantially
lessening competition . . . or tending to
s
create a monopoly
Summarizing, then, it can be said that the legislative history of the amendment reveals a certain intention to fashion section 7 as a weapon against the
conglomerate merger. The architects of the amendment spoke at length of
the calamitous effects of unchecked econormic concentration, market control,
and the disappearance of competition. Under the rug of this large language
could be swept virtually any type of corporate integration, horizontal, vertical,
or conglomerate. Clear does the fact remain that the dominant impact of the
amendment was to be in foreclosing anticompetitive mergers achieved through
the device of the acquiring corporation purchasing the assets of the acquired
corporation. But clear too is the evidence supporting the conclusion that conglomerate mergers, as a matter of projected legal possibility, are within the
27 96 CONG. REc. 16449 (1950) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney); 96
(1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
28

96 CoNG. Rac. 16449 (1950).

29
30

H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
Id. at 11.
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ambit of section 7 as it presently reads. Though the legislative history is spotty
on the point, and quantitatively there is little time or space devoted to it, there
would seem to be no doubt but that section 7 now gives adequate statutory
authorization to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice to proceed against conglomerate mergers. 1 However,
taking lower ground, whether conglomerate mergers are within the ambit of
section 7 as a matter of projected practical economic probability is a question
by no means free from doubt. The balance of this article will attempt to furnish
an answer to this question.
II. Federal Trade Commission Decisions
Recent rulings by the Federal Trade Commission furnish some illumination on the pattern of decision that may be expected in the future with respect
to conglomerate mergers. The Procter and Gamble Co. 2 ruling is of particular interest, and deserves extended analysis. Procter and Gamble on August 1,
1957, acquired all the assets of the Clorox Chemical Company, maker of the
largest-selling brand of household bleach. At the time of the acquisition,
Procter and Gamble was, and still is, the leading producer of soap and detergent products, as well as a major producer of food, paper, shampoos, dentifrices,
and home permanents. Procter and Gamble, already a large, diversified company, was able, by its acquisition of Clorox, to enter yet another market. But
the market Procter and Gamble chose to enter was one already highly concentrated, and this factor was decisive in the Federal Trade Commission's appraisal
of the case.
Prior to the acquisition, Clorox enjoyed a strong dominant position in
the industry. For the two months of June and July, 1957, Clorox had 48.8
per cent of the total national sales in the household bleach market. Its closest
competitor, Purex Chemical Company, controlled but 15.7 per cent of the
total sales. None of the remaining competitors had more than 6 per cent of
the market. Following the acquisition, Clorox sales, for the first two months
immediately following the acquisition, rose to 49.6 per cent of the total, thus
further solidifying its already dominant market position.
The hearing examiner's initial decision ordered a divestiture by Procter
and Gamble of all the assets of the Clorox Chemical Co. The ruling declared
that the acquisition would tend substantially to lessen competition between
Clorox and other bleach companies, by further strengthening Clorox's already
dominant market position. Findings made by the hearing examiner were:
1) Clorox's dominant market position was increased due
to advertising, promotion programs, and other merchandising
devices used by Procter and Gamble.
2) Procter and Gamble possesses great financial and economic strength compared with other producers in the bleach
market competing with Clorox.
31 The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice were given concurrent jurisdiction in the enforcement of section 7. S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
32 TRADE REG. REP. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) %28881 (July 11, 1960).
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3) Procter and Gamble products enjoy a large measure of
consumer acceptance. This, combined with Procter and Gamble's
ability to obtain choice shelf and display space in retail outlets,
further catapults Clorox ahead of its competitors, since Clorox
is now able to take advantage of Procter and Gamble's superior
marketability.
4) Clorox is now able, through advertising and promotion
inspired by Procter and Gamble, to prevent additional competitors from entering the household bleach field.
The case thus illustrates in sharp detail the anticompetitive consequences
that can stem from a conglomerate merger. Procter and Gamble, though not
in the household bleach market, is able to enter the market through a merger
aimed at diversification of its operations. Once in the market, it brings its huge
resources to bear upon an industry already concentrated to a high degree. The
small competitors of Clorox are thus placed in the position of competing not
just with Clorox alone, but also with the formidable market and financial
strength of Procter and Gamble.
This strength is felt along several fronts. An increase in managerial skills
and executive talents is likely in a conglomerate merger.3" An increase in total
assets and financial resources is almost a certainty, save in those cases where
the acquired firm is in a failing condition, bringing more liabilities and losses
to the merger than assets and profits.3 A decrease in overhead expenses resulting from consolidated operations oftentimes represents the primary purpose
of many integrations." The economies of quantity buying, principally reflected
in discount rates, will frequently be a measure of increased strength attendant
to a merger. Testimony introduced by the FTC in the Procter and Gamble
case showed that for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1958, the joint purchase of advertising by Procter and Gamble and Clorox, bought at volume
discount rates, had saved Clorox $138,500.
Perhaps more important than any of these items, however, was the promotional and advertising support Procter and Gamble was able to give to Clorox.
Evidence showed that Procter and Gamble spent in excess of $79 million for
advertising during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957. The FTC elicited
from one of its witnesses, the executive of a company competing with Clorox
in the bleach market, testimony showing that the factor most feared by competitors was the financial resources Clorox had available for advertising as a
result of the acquisition.3
33

See Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, in 1959
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34 The so-called "failing company" doctrine originated with the Supreme Court decision
in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). Under this doctrine, it is a valid
defense to an action under section 7 to show that the acquired company is on the verge of
financial collapse, and will be driven into bankruptcy if it is not permitted to merge. For a
recent discussion and re-examination of the foundations of the failing company doctrine, see
Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J. 84 (1960).
35 See The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1961, p. 2, col. 2, reporting announcement of
a proposed merger between the Chicago & Northwestern Railway and the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad. It has been estimated by spokesmen of the companies that
savings realized as a result of the merger will total $40 million before income taxes.
36 TRADE REG. REP. (1959-1960 FTC C".) f 28881 (July 11, 1960). See also com-
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On the basis of all these factors, the FTC hearing examiner ruled that
the acquisition would tend substantially to lessen competition in the household
bleach industry, and ordered Procter and Gamble to divest itself of all the
assets of Clorox it had acquired.
The Reynolds Metals CoY case offers illustration of a large enterprise
making its impact felt in a small industry shared by a number of firms competing on a relatively equal basis in terms of market control. Technically, the
merger here was of the forward vertical type. Reynolds, manufacturer of aluminum foil, acquired Arrow Brands, Inc., a producer of florist foil, a thin
decorative material made from aluminum foil and used for packaging and
display purposes by retail florists. Reynolds produced no florist foil, so its merger with Arrow Brands represented the vertical acquisition of a customer.
Arrow Brands' total annual sales, before the merger, were about $500,000.
Florist foil being a specialty product, sales in the entire industry were never
more than $2 million annually. Into this market picture moved Reynolds, with
annual sales of over $400 million. The impact on the small florist foil industry
was soon felt. Arrow Brands built a new plant costing $500,000. It drastically
reduced its prices on florist foil, even selling at below cost in some cases, according to the FTC. Arrow Brands' advertising was substantially increased. According to testimony from other florist foil competitors, it was just a matter
of time until they were driven out of business altogether.38 The conclusion,
thought the FTC, was inescapable: vast Reynolds' resources standing behind
Arrow Brands would drive all other producers from the market, destroying
competition and concentrating the entire industry in one firm. The FTC
ordered divestiture of all Arrow Brands' assets acquired by Reynolds. A petition by Reynolds for a reopening of the proceedings on the ground of new
entrants into the field subsequent to the order of divestiture was denied.39
One commentator has pointed out that the decision may well be a clue
to the Commission's future treatment of conglomerate mergers, noting that
little attention was paid to the usual features characteristic of a vertical acquisition.4" The Commission could have reached the same result, it is argued, if the
attempted merger had been conglomerate instead of vertical:
If Reynolds had manufactured batteries instead of aluminum foil,
it probably would have absorbed the price decreases and could have
constructed a new plant, and practically everything else the Commission said concerning the effects of the merger would have been
applicable. Perhaps, then, the Reynolds case unintentionally gives
us a clue on how the prosecutors might approach conglomerates:
namely, select those which involve larger companies moving into
predominantly small business fields; let them occur, but then watch

plaint filed in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., TRADE RG. REe. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.)
28891 (July 13, 1960).
37 TRADE REG. REP. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) ff 28533 (Jan. 21, 1960).
38 Similar charges of widespread price cutting by a large firm, to the detriment of small
competitors, have been alleged by the FTC complaint recently filed in the case of Ecko
Products Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) ff 29106 (Oct. 12, 1960).
39 TRADE REG. REP. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) g 28666.

40 Jacobs, Mergers and the Small Businessman, 16 A.B.A.
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the industries very closely for possible anti-competitive developments. If these appear, then sue for divestiture.41
Former FTC Chairman Earl Kintner, commenting on the Reynolds decision, in a speech before the New York State Bar Association, made the following observation:
The acquisition by a large and powerful diversified company of a
small company in a discrete industry historically shared by a number of small companies competing on equal terms followed by drastic
competitive injury to the smaller competitors might be a demonstration of anticompetitive effect sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirements even if the acquisition was truly conglomerate. I do
not mean to suggest that I am personally or officially wedded 4to
2
this theory - I mention it only as a possible subject of speculation.
Mr. Kintner's hedging reservation that he is not wedded to the position presumably represents the official doubt the Commission has entertained since
1950 with respect to conglomerate acquisitions. The fact that the Commission
had not taken, as of 1959, any action against a true conglomerate acquisition43
indicates a large misgiving as to the government's ability to make out a satisfactory case in this area. As pointed out above, as a matter of projected legal
possibility, conglomerates have been within the sweep of section 7 since 1950.
But as a matter of projected practical economic probability, a large doubt remains. This doubt, exhibited in Mr. Kintner's aside, finds its adequate demonstration in the government's reluctance to take any concerted action thus far."
Mr. Kintner closed his remarks on this point with the prophesy that "it would
appear that the long-existing dearth of standards by which to judge the effects
of conglomerate acquisitions may not exist much longer."
He may well have
spoken the truth. The Reynolds' Metals case certainly foreshadows a new direction. Of even more direct pertinence is the hearing examiner's ruling in Procter
and Gamble. If the rationale of this decision survives the scrutiny of full Commission review, and possible further judicial attack, it will stand as the first
visible landmark in a field where it has been cautioned that "standards of illegality seem wholly elusive." 4 Further, personnel and policy changes within
the FTC, a certain eventuality with the change to a Democratic administration,
may well produce verification of the rumors that the government is mapping
a concerted campaign against conglomerate acquisitions.4"
Principal objections to the Government's taking any action against conglomerate mergers are twofold. First, it is asserted that these mergers are in
the best interests of the business community and the public," representing legi41 Id. at 88.
42 Address by Earl W. Kintner, 1961 Annual Meeting of New York State Bar Association, pp. 40-41, January 26, 1961.
43 Jacobs, supra note 40, at 84.
44 The evidentiary burden that must be borne by the Government in section 7 cases is
obviously formidable, considering the statutory language of future prediction involved in
"... . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." (Emphasis
added.)

45 Kintner, supra note 42, at 41.

46 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 131 (1959).
47 See note 5 supra.
48 See argument raised by the defendant in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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timate expansion and diversification of existing facilities. The going concern
can introduce a greater measure of equilibrium and financial stability into its
operations by acquiring additional companies. 49 Second, much is made of the
fact that economic standards by which to characterize, analyze, and judge the
competitive consequences of conglomerate acquisitions are too illusory and conjectural.5" Since we can expect the protests to grow more vocal as conglomerate
mergers come under closer scrutiny, it is necessary to examine the problems
presented by these objections.
III. Reasons for Corporate Acquisitions
In discussing the phenomenon of conglomerate mergers, resort is often
had to the reasons prompting a given merger. This poses a distinct problem,
for antitrust legislation - at least Section 7 of the Clayton Act-is bottomed
on the supposedly objective criterion of market power.5" That is to say, the
question of whether a given industry exhibits excessive economic concentration,
or is in fact a monopoly, is measured by market power. If the market is swallowed up by one firm, competition is diminished, weakened, and finally destroyed. But if market power is an objective fact, then what possible relevance
can be ascribed to the motives and purposes of the business community in
carrying out any given merger?
The problem is raised because of the large number of conglomerate mergers
supposedly undertaken for diversification purposes.5" The evidence suggests
that a large number of mergers-perhaps a plurality-are undertaken today
for reasons aside from a wish for market control and monopolistic domination.
Combinations in the late 1800's, and in the early part of this century, were
inspired by aggressive motives of domination and market power. Government
controls being largely non-existent, small economic units were easy prey for
robber-barons intent on increasing the size and impact on their corporate empires. In that era, corporate acquisitions and market control were apparently
sought for their own sake. Colossal combinations and trusts, already vectored on
a sure course of prosperity and success, sought ever further expansion and
53
control.
By contrast, it is argued that present-day incentives for expansion are far
less ambitious and predatory.5 4 Business community spokesmen talk of mergers
not in language of 19th-century rugged individualism and competitive survival
of the fittest, but in language of cost savings, 5 tax advantages," and pooling of
49 See McCarthy, Premeditated Mergers, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1961, p. 74.
50 The Wall Street Journal has asserted that any effort by the Government to undertake
a large-scale enforcement program against conglomerate mergers carried out for diversification will produce a "metaphysical maze," in which the businessman will be unable to tell
what he can and cannot do. Note 5, supra.
51 MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 398-400 (1957).
52 KEEZER, NEW FORCES IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 170 (1959).
53 LINDAHL & CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 24-26 (1959);
KEEZER, op. cit. supra note 52 at 169.
54 KEEZER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 169-171.
55 See note 34, supra.
56 Because of the favorable treatment accorded net operating loss deductions under INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172, a firm with a large net profit will seek to merge with a company

CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
managerial talent." The chief reasons for postwar mergers in the last 15 years,
it has been said, are financial stability, profit protection, and increased sales.s
Stress is laid on the fact that a business will seek diversification of its operations
to furnish economic protection not available in a one-product enterprise. By
expanding into unrelated fields, the large firm can protect itself against the
eventuality that future market conditions or unexpected economic factors will
drive its primary product into a non-competitive and losing posture.
There can be no doubt that the incidence of conglomerate mergers is high,
representing an attempt to expand into new markets such as found in Procter
and Gamble and in Reynolds Metals. A recent study estimates that approximately 40 per cent of all mergers are conglomerate,5" in the sense that the chief
objective of these mergers is diversification. Diversification, of course, can always
be achieved by original capital expenditure, building of new plants, and launching a new enterprise. Firms are more interested in acquiring a going concern,
however, rather than inaugurating an entirely new enterprise. The FTC has
said that a corporation, intent on diversification, prefers to acquire existing
assets rather than construct a new enterprise from scratch, even though the
costs would be the same.6"
On the one hand, then, we find the present-day business community
pursuing the benefits of diversification, establishing multi-product and multi-line
combinations for reasons of economy of operation and financial stability. On
the other hand, we find the philosophy of our antitrust laws, as embodied in
amended section 7, prohibiting mergers undertaken for diversification purposes
if such mergers have the proscribed effects."' Historically, in any conflict of this
type, private interests and ambitions give ground before the advance of government regulation and control. But the ground is taken and occupied by government regulation only under a banner of rules and standards possessing adequate
clarity and specifications. Failing this, government control and supervision becomes swamped in the morass of unconstitutionality. The most pressing problem,
therefore, is the enunciation and elaboration of standards by which the conglomerate merger can be judged in the light of section 7. Obviously, we cannot
take a wild swing and condemn all conglomerate acquisitions. Aside from being
an impossible mandate for the government to enforce, it would represent foolish
and unsophisticated economics, as well as bad law. But some standards must
be evolved if the legislative intent is to be carried out. Those conglomerate
mergers exhibiting no anticompetitive consequences must be classified and differentiated from acquisitions that produce substantial competitive deterioration.
that has experienced annual operating losses, setting off the losses against the profits and
thereby reducing taxes.
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58 McCarthy, supra note 49, at 74.
59 Nelson, Do Mergers Kill Competition, Challenge, Dec. 1960, quoted in KEEZER, op.
cit. supra note 52, at 170.
60 FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 106-09 (1955). For an
excellent study of this problem, as well as of the general economic ramifications of amended
section 7, see Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43
VA. L. Rnv. 489, 494 (1957).
61 For a representative reflection of the business community's attitude toward amended
section 7, see Cook, Thinking Ahead, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1959, p. 15.
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It is necessary,
in the words of Myron Watkins, to separate " the sheep from the
6'2
goats.)
In light of the amendment to section 7, it must be insisted that motive is
an unimportant and irrelevant consideration. We are not here dealing with
conspiracy or collusion restraints under the Sherman Act, where some illegal
motive and predatory intent would have to be shown. Section 7 of the Clayton
Act very clearly proscribes any merger where the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition or create a monopoly. Motives and purposes are therefore
irrelevant, and the business community cannot hope to exonerate itself from
the strictures of section 7 by insisting, however righteously, that 40 per cent or
even 90 per cent of its mergers are undertaken with proper objectives in mind."3
It is imperative that the business community be freed from the misconception
that merger justifications in the form of cost reductions, pooled assets, economies
of scale, etc., will suffice to escape the Clayton Act.
To introduce justifications of this sort would represent a step backward
in our antitrust enforcement policy. The Sherman Act, intended to be a tower
of strength against undesirable forms of concentration, was whittled down by
the Supreme Court's "rule of reason." 4 Congress then passed the Clayton Act,
to put, in Professor Schwartz's phrase, "teeth in the old Sherman Act gums.... 65
The Clayton Act was supposedly designed with new, more stringent criteria,
different from the rule of reason spawned by the Supreme Court. But Sherman
Act standards were in turn read into the Clayton Act by the decision in International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C 6 Consequently, the 1950 amendment to section 7
gave the statute criteria independent of the Sherman Act. This was made clear
in the Senate Committee Report, where it was pointed out that
the bill is not intended to revert to Sherman Act tests. The intent
here, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have
67
attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.
The Clayton Act was an effort to overcome the "rule of reason" by introducing "per se" tests of illegality. Whereas the rule of reason demands a broad
investigation into all relevant economic factors, the per se test more rigidly
proscribes certain economic behavior without regard to any mitigating justifications."8
Recent cases under amended section 7 make it perfectly clear that new
standards of illegality are to be employed in the act's enforcement. Actual
monopoly or actual lessening of competition need not be shown. A reasonable
probability that these consequences will emerge is sufficient.69 Further, it is
62 Watkins, Book Review, 47 Am. ECON. REv. 747, 749 (1957).
63 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (dissenting opinion),
wherein Mr. Justice Douglas says "The fact that they [leaders of large corporations] are not
vicious men but respectable and social-minded is irrelevant."
64 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
65 Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949).
66 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
67 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
68 See generally, MASON, Op. cit. supra note 51, at 392-98; Webster, The Clayton Act
Today: Merging and Marketing, in 1959 ANTITRUST LAW SymposIuM, HOW TO COMPLY
WITH THE CLAYTON ACT 74 (1959).
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of no moment that the proponents of the merger acted for what they deemed
a beneficial purpose. "It [Congress] made no distinction between good mergers
and bad mergers.""0 In proving its case, the government is not required to
establish motive or intent for a transaction.7 If the proscribed effects take place,
that is sufficient for section 7 enforcement.
In light of these decisions, as well as the FTC rulings referred to earlier,
it seems clear that amended section 7 will be applied and enforced with a good
deal of rigorous precision. This being the case, it is necessary to approach the
question posed earlier: whether as a matter'of practical economic probability,
the conglomerate merger can be brought within the effective operational perimeter of section 7 enforcement. To hazard an answer to this question, we must
analyze the realities and actualities of economic behavior as they emerge within
the framework of conglomerate mergers.
IV. Relevant Economic Factors
Any realistic program of antitrust enforcement is necessarily bottomed on
economic data. The legal profession turns to economics for information about
the performance and behavior of a commercial society. It also looks for criteria
by which reasonable, accurate conclusions and reliable predictions can be made,
so that by extrapolation from known data and known situations, something
relevant can be said about unknown future situations.
Under traditional economic theory, monopoly results when one firm so
controls a market that prices are no longer arrived at competitively, but are set
by the independent decision of the monopolistic firm. Competitive market
conditions and methods of price setting, consequently, are the chief focal points
around which monopoly inquiry revolves.7 2 As the situation moves from monopoly to oligopoly, or monopolistic competition between a few very large firms
within an industry, standards for judgment are less clear, but the relevant
inquiry still concerns market control.
The question that must be raised at this point, however, is whether the
traditional nomenclature of monopoly power, with all its connotations, is adequate to the task of description and analysis needed if the diversified, multi-line
corporation-the conglomerate-is to be placed in proper perspective vis-a-vis
the antitrust laws. At the present stage of knowledge and analysis," it is the
opinion of many authorities that the conglomerate firm, and more specifically,
the conglomerate merger, is too far out of focus to be viewed sharply through
70 Id. at 618.
71 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producer's Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D.D.C.
1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). It should be noted that while the court below properly
discounted and refused to admit testimony on intent or motive as justification evidence, on
behalf of the defendant, it permitted the Government to introduce testimony on motive and
intent as condemnatory evidence, so as to make its case even stronger against the particular
merger in question.
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the lens of the Clayton Act.7" Standards and data are too speculative and conjectural to offer any sound hope that conglomerate acquisitions can ever be
brought within the sweep of the Act. As pointed out previously, though there
can be little doubt that conglomerate mergers are within the ambit of section 7
as a matter of projected legal possibility, there is widespread doubt among
authorities as to whether this form of acquisition is within the statute as a
matter of practical economic probability. The misgivings stem from the fact
that antitrust enforcement involves far more than a network of abstract legal
precepts. Of necessity it also involves painstaking analysis of empiric data drawn
from the realities of economic experience and behavior.
Since economic data must be consulted, the next problem arises in determining what kind of data will be presented, and how much. The phrase "quantitative substantiality"75 has been brought forward in litigation and discussion under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, only to be scorned and driven from the scene.7"
Though some groups will wish for a single set of rules delimiting illegal activity
under the Clayton Act, economists will warn that all relevant factors must be
examined before satisfactory answers can be formulated. But to plunge into the
jungle of all relevant economic factors may invite disaster. The confusion introduced by a wholesale examination of all data available in any given case may
drive antitrust enforcement programs to the point of unworkability, and may be
their undoing.7 The method of measuring economic concentration and market
power thus becomes crucial.
But if conglomerate concentration cannot be analyzed within the usual
conceptual framework and nomenclature of monopoly and market control, then
it is submitted that the focus be placed on size and bigness of such, honestly recognizing that the problem of conglomerate strength brought about by diversification mergers is a problem stemming from inherent size and economic power.78
The advantage of this approach is that emphasis is shifted from the particularities
of market control stated with reference to a particular kind of product. A large
diversified company will successfully compete in several product markets at the
same time. It may have no monopolistic domination or strong market control in
any particular line,79 but the impact of its accumulated financial strength will
be felt sharply by the small, single-product competitor. The situations presented
in Procter and Gamble and Reynolds Metals amply illustrate this.
74 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 131 (1959); KEEZER, NEW FORCES IN AMEICAN BUSINESS 170 (1959); Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, in
1959 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSiUM, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAYTON ACT 83 (1959);

Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 184 (1955);
Adelman, The Du Pont-General Motors Decision, 43 VA. L. REV. 873, 875 (1957). It is
also significant that the report of the Attorney General's Committee specifically excluded
any treatment of the conglomerate merger. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 119 n. 11 (1955).
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See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 122 (1955), wherein it is asserted that in no merger case under § 7
can the "quantitative substantiality" rule be substituted for a broader examination of the
relevant market factors.
78 This is the line of analysis developed by Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source
of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331 (1955).
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Further, it must be recognized that a truly conglomerate firm is rare."0
There wil almost always be horizontal and vertical connectives in any large
diversified operation, thus further complicating the isolation of particular data
necessary to determine the extent of control and anticompetitive power within
any particular market.
Let us take but one example of how the conglomerate firm may be analyzed
in terms of anticompetitive power without direct resort to concepts of monopolistic domination and market control. Let us say that A Corporation produces
50 discrete items, with a sufficient degree of functional independence to warrant
calling the firm conglomerate. Let us further say that one of A Corporation's
items, Product X, has 10 per cent of the total sales market, the remainder of
the market being fragmented among 10 or 12 other firms in a highly competitive
situation. By using Product X as a loss leader, selling it at below cost, strong
consumer demand can be created.8 ' Additionally, if A Corporation has integrated retail outlets, the loss leader can create a large consumer attraction for
its other products as well. The loss leader thus serves the twin purpose of increased consumer demand for Product X, and expanded consumer exposure
to the remaining 49 products. The loss taken on Product X can be adequately
absorbed by the large conglomerate because of its financial strength spread
throughout a large number of markets, whereas the competitors of A Corporation cannot meet the lower price at which Product X is sold. As a result,
Product X eventually captures a substantial bulk of the total sales, driving the
small single-product competitor from the market. A Corporation can then
adjust its prices upward to meet its production costs of Product X.
The only factor preventing A Corporation's absorption of the entire market
will be another conglomerate, producing the same product, able to match the
downward adjustment of A Corporation's loss leader. At this point, the market
becomes oligopolistic, with two or perhaps three firms controlling the entire
market. But the point is unimportant. What is important is that several small
competitors have been driven from a market that was formerly highly competitive.
Other examples could be cited showing how a conglomerate, by its sheer
size and financial resources, can drive small competitors from the market. As
already pointed out in connection with the Proter and Gamble case, large-scale
advertising is perhaps the most potent weapon available to the large diversified
firm. In a small industry, where a dozen competitors may have a roughly equal
share of the market, the advertising and promotion capabilities of any one firm
will never so far outweigh other producers so as to give a distinct competitive
advantage to one firm. But if one firm out of this dozen suddenly merges with
a large and prosperous concern, its increment in advertising and promotional
potential quickly forces the smaller firms into a non-competitive position. Unable
to compete successfully, the small firms are then easy prey, subject to acquisition
themselves.
In addition to the strong possibility of driving existing competition from
80
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the market, the conglomerate acquisition by a large, financially stable firm of
a small competitor will also make entry into the market by new competitors
more difficult. Economic theory discusses entry by new competition in terms of
the ability or inability of existing firms persistently to raise their prices above
minimum cost levels without attracting new competitors." That is, if entry is
easy, existing competitors cannot afford to raise prices persistently without
running the risk of new firms appearing in the market who can produce the
product at a lower cost, thus bringing prices down. On the other hand, if existing
firms can continue to raise prices but no new competitor can successfully capture
part of the market by setting a lower price, entry becomes more difficult, and
the particular industry more nearly approaches a state of monopoly wherein
prices are not determined competitively. Inability of potential new entrants to
penetrate a market is one of the standard criteria for determining the illegality
of a merger under section 7.s
In view of the substantial anticompetitive effects that can be introduced
into a given market structure by a large conglomerate, it is puzzling that so
eminent an authority as Professor Stigler should say that ". . . the exact mechanics
by which the total power possessed by the firm gets to be larger than the sum
of the parts (in individual markets) escape me, and I am not sure that there
are any companies that meet the specifications of the conglomerate firm." 4
Professor Stigler is right in saying that the pure conglomerate firm, functionally
and organically distinct in all its operations, is perhaps rare. But it seems impossible to deny the existence of several diversified, multi-line firms in American
industry that exhibit "significant degrees of incoherence in business function"8
in discrete markets to warrant their separate classification and treatment for
antitrust purposes.
Taking the existence of such firms as a working premise, it is submitted
that the dominant and individualizing characteristic of the conglomerate firm
is the ability to shift financial resources and competitive strength through a
broad front of functionally discrete markets, strategically altering the selected
point of greatest impact as time, place, and market conditions require.As pointed
out in the hypothetical case posed above, it is unnecessary that the conglomerate
enjoy full domination in any one market. It may have no more than 10 per
cent of any one market, but it is able to concentrate its efforts at one point by
shifting its financial resources and competitive strength from one market to
another.
Consequently, any conglomerate merger which triggers this strategic shifting
of financial resources and competitive strength should be prohibited by section 7,
if it substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly. This approach follows the general rationale set out in Reynolds Metals and also by the
hearing examiner in Procterand Gamble. If the conglomerate merger cannot be
successfully analyzed by means of the traditional nomenclature and conceptual
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structure of monopolistic concentration and market control, then the alternative
holding the most promise is to stress the strategic shifting of financial resources
and market strength among a number of different markets.It has been urged that striking down conglomerate mergers because of an
increase in managerial talents and productive facilities, or because of an increase
in financial resources "would come close to penalizing economic power without
more."' This, it is submitted, is an erroneous conclusion. First, the question
under section 7 is whether the merger may substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly. If either of these conditions are produced by a given
merger, it is irrelevant how the condition was achieved. Was competition in
fact lessened within this line of commerce? That is the only relevant inquiry."8

The fact that market domination or monopoly was achieved because of large
economic power has nothing to do with it. Second, it is important to see the
manner in which the large conglomerate is able, stritegically, to shift its financial
resources and competitive strength from one market to another. The small,
single-product firm generally cannot afford many of the techniques and programs so necessary to modem-day economic survival, such as mass advertising,
continuing product research, and long-term capital borrowing at low rates.8 "
The competitive superiority of the conglomerate firm seems beyond dispute.
If this superiority results in a substantial lessening of competition in a market
entered by the conglomerate, the strictures of section 7 should be invoked.
Further, as Professor Edwards has pointed out, the large firm also enjoys substantial non-market advantages over its smaller rivals in such activities as litigation, politics, and public relations.90 These sources of superior power further
strengthen the diversified company's competitive advantage.
It may not be necessary to go'this far, however. It has been argued that
the conglomerate can be analyzed within the usual conceptual framework of
market control and monopoly. 1 This may well be true, at least for purposes of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Inasmuch as section 7 is designed to prevent
monopoly in advance, rather than correct a monopolistic condition once it has
86 See Union Carbide Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 6826 (1958), wherein the hearing examiner
dismissed a complaint against respondent, a large multi-line conglomerate, which had alleged
that it had acquired a non-related industry and then supported its operations with its huge
resources. The position unsuccessfully urged by the Government was substantially the same one
taken in this article.
87 Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, in 1959 ANTITRUST LAW
SYmPOSIUM, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAYTON ACT 83 (1959).
88 The Supreme Court has said:
We hold that any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the
stock of another corporation, competitor or not, is within the reach of the
section [7] whenever the reasonable likelihood appears that the acquisition
will result in a restraint of commerce or in the creation of a monopoly of
any line of commerce. United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592
(1957). (Emphasis added.)
89
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been achieved, it would seem clear that the conglomerate merger could be
analyzed with reference to competitive deterioration and market control in the
market occupied by the acquired company.
As the Supreme Court has said, "Monopoly power is the power to control
prices or exclude competition." 92 Consequently, if a large, multi-line firm diversifies its operations even further by acquiring a small firm in a highly competitive
market composed of several small units, with competition being excluded and
driven from the market occupied by the acquired firm, there is, arguably,
sufficient warrant for the application of section 7. If, following the merger,
substantial concentration were observed taking place within the market occupied
by the acquired company, the provisions of section 7 could be invoked to undo
the acquisition.9 3
Conclusion
The conglomerate merger, slippery and unmeasurable, is now within the
scope of the Clayton Act. The legislative draftsmen declared that this form of
merger is to be proscribed if it has the effect of substantially lessening competition or tends to create a monopoly. The legal authorization for antimerger
activity in this field is clear. The operational dimensions of section 7 are less
clear, owing to deficiencies in economic prediction and understanding. Whether
these two levels of analysis can be brought together into one coherent formulation, producing an intelligible antitrust enforcement policy, depends on a number
of factors. The chief factor, it would seem, is whether the true characteristics of
the conglomerate merger are recognized for what they are. The conglomerate
firm derives its strength from its financial resources, its size, from a number of
non-market power advantages, and most important, from its ability to shift
these advantages from one market to another. If these attributes do not fall
into the customary theoretical molds of monopoly and market power, then new
fronts of economic theory and analysis must be explored, and new dimensions
of economic reality must be penetrated.
A large number of mergers intended for diversification of already existing
operations will never be subject to attack under section 7, simply because no
lessening of competition will result. Indeed, in many such mergers, competition
will no doubt be quickened, due to the gathered strength of small business
enterprises now more able to match the efforts of larger competitors. As to
mergers in this class, we hail them as salutary, sure in the knowledge that the
health of our economy would be the worse by preventing them.
But upon conglomerate mergers carried out by firms already well diversified
into several markets, the law must look with a more critical eye. When an already
large multi-line company moves into a market occupied by small competitors,
as occurred in Reynolds Metals, alert surveillance by the antitrust enforcement
agencies is most decidedly necessary if the relevant market in which the acquired
company competes is to be protected. If substantial competitive deterioration
92 United States v. du Pont & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
93 This is substantially the position taken by Jacobs, referred to above, in his comment
on the Reynolds Metals case. See note 40 supra, and accompanying text.
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develops after the merger has taken place, appropriate investigation 4 and enforcement measures 5 should be taken. As with all antitrust enforcement, specific
guidelines must be hammered out on the forge of individual cases and litigated
controversies. With the swift pace of merger activity at the present time, we can
hope that such clarifying specifications will soon be forthcoming.

94 See S. 166, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), recently introduced by Senator Kefauver,
which would require that advance notice be filed with the FTC and the Attorney General
of any merger wherein the combined capital and surplus of the corporations exceeded

$10,000,000.

95 S. 167, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), also introduced by Senator Kefauver, which
would enlarge the powers of the Justice Department to compel the production of documentary
evidence pursuant to an investigation of antitrust violations.

